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The Knower and the Known: Physicalism, Dualism, and the Nature of Intelli-
gibility, by Stephen Parrish. South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2013. 
444 pages. $38.00 (paperback). ISBN: 978-1-58731-420-9.
JAMES D. MADDEN, Benedictine College
The Knower and the Known: Physicalism, Dualism, and the Nature of Intel-
ligibility, by Stephen Parrish, is a grand treatise covering a wide range of 
issues in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of religion, metaphysics 
and epistemology. Parrish draws together elements from these various 
philosophical sub-disciplines in order to defend a theistic explanation of 
the intelligibility of the world. According to Parish, the notion of intel-
ligibility calls for a two-fold explanation in terms of both “the known and 
the knower, or the entity that is intelligible and the subject to whom the 
intelligibility of the object is understood” (2). That is, the intelligibility 
of the world requires an account of both how it is that the world is un-
derstandable and how it is that we are able of understanding the world. 
Parrish argues that these accounts can be given only in terms of a theistic 
dualism according to which human minds are understood as analogues 
to the divine mind. The intelligibility of the world is then provided by 
its conformity to divine ideas, and the ability to grasp such intelligibility 
by finite minds is accounted for in terms of their similarity to the mind 
of God.
The Knower and the Known is divided into four sections (with two ap-
pendices). The first section is a brief introduction to the problem Parrish 
sets for himself and his method for addressing it. The fourth section is a 
summary of the sweeping argument of the entire book. Most of the philo-
sophical heavy lifting (and there is much of it to be done) is taken up in 
the second and third sections. The first of these central sections contains 
an in-depth argument against naturalist (mainly physicalist) theories of 
consciousness, stemming from their collective failure to offer an acceptable 
account of human understanding. The third section is devoted to develop-
ing and defending in detail the theistic dualism that Parrish offers as the 
most plausible way of averting the limitations of philosophical naturalism. 
In what follows, I address each of these sections in a bit more detail.
Parrish begins the second section with a chapter mapping the concep-
tual landscape of contemporary philosophy of mind and metaphysics 
relevant to his project, wherein he defines and distinguishes various ver-
sions of dualism, physicalism, emergentism, and views regarding abstract 
objects. With these distinctions in mind, Parrish continues in the follow-
ing chapter with a discussion of the nature of physical objects as such. 
One of his conclusions, drawing on the work of Howard Robinson and 
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Jennifer McKitrick, is that a purely physicalist account of physical objects 
would need to be given solely in terms of dispositional properties. Dispo-
sitions, however, must be dispositions of something, so Parrish concludes 
that “physical entities must receive their existence from some other kind 
of being” (74). Thus, the physicalist is not only confronted by the difficulty 
of finding a place for consciousness in a universe supposedly composed 
entirely of fundamentally non-conscious entities (at least under stan-
dard versions of physicalism), but likewise with the serious question of 
whether she can even give a satisfactory story about the physical objects 
to which she would have us reduce everything else. Though this line of 
anti-physicalist criticism is not Parrish’s main aim, attacking physicalism 
not just for its increasingly famous failures in the philosophy of mind, but 
also for its less well publicized conundrums in the metaphysics of mate-
rial objects, is a welcome addition to these debates.
Parish then spends the next chapter arguing against the standard natu-
ralist positions in recent philosophy of mind, and in all of these cases he 
concludes that naturalists are unable “to give a reasonable account of why 
there is such a thing as consciousness, nor why our consciousness has the 
properties that it does” (185). Though he stakes his case on controversial 
positions, Parrish’s arguments are thorough and well-informed by the 
relevant literature, and they are deserving of replies from his physicalist 
interlocutors. In the final chapter of the third section, Parish addresses 
various versions of naturalistic property dualism (anomalous monism, 
neutral monism, dual aspect theory, epiphenomenalism, etc.). He presses 
technical difficulties with each of these positions specifically, but the main 
locus of worry is that the facts of phenomenal experience and intellec-
tual agency show us that “Perceptions and thoughts are not free floating, 
but belong to a subject,” which is something no account of the mind as a 
mere aggregate of properties (epiphenomenal or otherwise) can explain; 
whereas the “necessity of having a subject as the thinker of thoughts is 
easily accounted for by substance dualism” (202).
With his rejection of broadly naturalistic accounts of mind soundly in 
place, Parrish develops an unabashedly substance dualist theory in the 
third section. In the first three chapters, Parrish employs a partly phe-
nomenological method to draw out all of the relevant aspects of rational 
consciousness. Parrish guides this intricate investigation to the conclusion 
that human understanding requires an irreducible subjectivity (including 
qualitative properties) related to abstract or ideal objects. Recent attempts 
to ignore or explain away these aspects of consciousness (both subjectivity 
and its relation to abstracta) founder on problems of self-referential inco-
herence or the plain facts of common sense about our experience of our-
selves as conscious, rational agents. The point here is that our awareness 
of the world is qualitative, but also subject to universal laws transcending 
our immediate awareness; and this dual fact is difficult for naturalism to 
accommodate.
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In the final chapter of this section, we reach what may be the crux of 
Parrish’s vast project; namely, Parrish develops and defends his theistic 
dualism as the best available explanation of this dual nature of rational 
consciousness. Parrish takes up two explanatory questions facing us at 
this point: how do we explain the existence of the abstract objects that 
render the world intelligible to consciousness; and how do we explain 
the relationship between the non-physical human mind and the physical 
world it finds intelligible? Parrish begins to address the former question 
by arguing against both nominalism and Platonist versions of realism. In 
their place he defends what he calls “theistic conceptualism,” according to 
which abstract or ideal objects, though they are not independently exist-
ing entities in their own right, exist primarily in the mind of God, whose 
immutable nature assures their universal and necessary being, despite 
their ontological dependence. Finite particular objects can be instances of 
such abstract natures because they are the effects of God’s creative will. In 
short, the world is intelligible because it is a reflection of the divine ideas, 
and here Parrish basically defends the sort of theistic Neoplatonism that 
has been quite prominent in the Christian philosophical tradition since 
such luminaries as St. Augustine and St. Anselm. It is helpful to see this 
old and venerable position put into a conversation with recent metaphysi-
cal and epistemological literature.
The primary worry motivating the latter question is the old anti-dualist 
canard regarding mental-physical causation. Though his earlier argu-
ments defending dualism do much to diffuse this worry, Parrish answers 
it directly by appealing to the Christian theist’s belief that “our minds are 
made in the image of God’s; they are finite analogs of God’s mind” (335). 
Thus, since God is certainly able to interact with, control, and alter physi-
cal reality, there is no reason in principle to doubt that human minds can, 
albeit to a lesser degree, do the same: “God’s maintaining the universe in 
existence is similar to a human mind’s occurrently thinking something” 
(330). In other words, Parrish argues that theism provides the key to under-
standing both the known and the knower, by giving us a model wherein 
the physical world can be taken as intelligible because of its relation to the 
divine ideas, and the human mind can be taken as capable of grasping 
such intelligibility because of its unique status as the imago dei. One may 
worry, however, whether the fact that God is related to the universe as its 
creator ex nihilo, and not just one efficient cause among others, might not 
provide disanalogy sufficient to undermine Parrish’s case for the latter.
Parrish does much more to defend this important line of argument than 
I have even come close to addressing in this short review, and I must leave 
it to the reader to take up the challenges and rewards of this sophisti-
cated philosophical treatise for herself. Suffice it to say, this effort will be 
worthwhile for anyone seriously interested in the philosophy of mind, 
metaphysics, and the philosophy of religion, and especially those of us 
who are concerned with their intersections.
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I have just two critical concerns. First, I find Parrish’s discussion of 
emergentism to be a bit too quick. There is significant recent work being 
done by such philosophers as John Searle and Timothy O’Connor who 
might best be characterized as naturalists (about human consciousness), 
but who should not be taken as physicalists in any straightforward sense. 
These philosophers defend versions of emergentism, which though highly 
controversial, amounts to some of the more interesting work being done 
in the wake of the now tired physicalist consensus. Indeed, even some 
Thomists, whom Parrish should see as worthy fellow travelers, defend 
naturalist, emergentist accounts of qualitative consciousness (though 
certainly not rationality!). Parrish does briefly consider emergentism (see 
59–62), but a more direct and sustained confrontation with these positions 
would strengthen his overall argument.
Parrish also presents his theistic conceptualism as a version of divine 
illuminationism (336), which is what one would expect given the Augus-
tinian/Anselmian roots of his position, and he also follows the classical 
version of this theory into some of its well-trod idealist consequences 
(338). Parrish does much to diffuse worries about subjective idealism, but 
at the end of the day he believes divine illumination (along with its ideal-
ist baggage) is something we must live with because the only alternative 
“is some naturalistic theory of the mind, usually conceived as a physicalist 
theory,” which he has done much to demonstrate as untenable. There is, 
however, another non-naturalist alternative Parrish does not address in 
detail. Thomistic philosophers, beginning with St. Thomas Aquinas him-
self in reaction to the divine illumination theories dominant in his day, 
frequently argue that the human intellect has an abstractive power that 
allows it to derive intelligibility from physical objects by direct experience. 
Such a power would transcend any physical explanation, but this theory 
is likewise designed to avoid even the hint of idealism. Once again, some 
consideration of this venerable alternative, especially its more recent itera-
tions, would have strengthened Parrish’s already very impressive work.
Moral Emotions: Reclaiming the Evidence of the Heart, by Anthony J. Steinbock. 
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2014. 354 pages. $34.95 
(paperback).
KYLE DAVID BENNETT, Caldwell University
Within contemporary phenomenology, Jean Luc-Marion has become 
the philosopher of givenness—degrees of givenness that culminate in his 
analyses of saturated phenomena. Anthony Steinbock could be called 
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